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ABSTRACT: Starting from the late seventies neoliberalism has emerged as the new global hegemonic par-
adigm. Several studies demonstrated that different factors facilitated the global spread of neoliberalism, 
but little attention has been paid to the role played by evaluation both in legitimizing the neoliberalization 
of the state and in explaining the resilience of neoliberalism. The article argues that evaluation is a strategy 
of action which is able to emphasize the adaptive capacity of neoliberalism to different socio-political con-
texts and the neoliberal purpose to depoliticize public action. The contribution aims to illustrate how eval-
uation works on a twofold level. On the one hand, evaluation is a tool of global governance that acts nor-
matively to homogenize states’ action consistently with some neoliberal values, such as competitiveness 
and economic efficiency. On the other hand, to conform to such values, variegated forms of evaluation are 
implemented by each state in order to introduce market rationality in non-economic domains, such as ed-
ucation and health system. Referring to some empirical cases, these two overlapping processes are termed 
as the “evaluated state” and “evaluative state”. As a result, neoliberalization by evaluation is a process in-
volving the elevation of market-based principles and techniques of evaluation to the level of state-
endorsed norms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the last economic and financial crisis, several authors announced 
the demise of neoliberalism (Stiglitz 2008). As Birch and Mykhnenko (2010, 255) point-
ed out: “Neoliberalism has self-destructed. The thirty-year long global march of free 
market ideology has come to an abrupt end”. More cautiously, David Harvey asked 
whether it was “really” the end of neoliberalism (Harvey 2009), concluding that “the 
current bailout [of banking system] is the same old story”. More convincingly, other au-
thors have described “the strange non-death of neoliberalism” (Crouch 2011) and 
“how neoliberalism survived the financial meltdown” (Mirowski 2013), thus suggesting 
that the crisis can be interpreted as an adaptation of the neoliberal paradigm. The di-
versity of opinions can be ascribed to the lack of a clear definition of neoliberalism, 
which has become an academic catchphrase (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009), applied to a 
wide range of phenomena and used in myriad ways in scholarship across social scienc-
es. But such a diversity also derives from different views of neoliberalism.  In fact, fol-
lowing Ward and England (2007), we can outline at least four understandings of ne-
oliberalism, with scholars that typically amalgamate two or more of them: 1) neoliber-
alism as an ideological hegemonic project; 2) neoliberalism as governmentality; 3) ne-
oliberalism as policy and program; 4) neoliberalism as state form.   
These understandings, as described below (see section no. 2), also propose alterna-
tive solutions to the resilience of neoliberal ideas, ranging from the historical dynamics 
which have produced the still hegemonic power of capitalist elites (Duménil and Levy 
2011) to the special capacity of neoliberalism to adapt to different social and economic 
contexts (Peck and Tickell 2002), as well as to become the political “rationality of con-
temporary capitalism” (Dardot and Laval 2014, 7). Few studies emphasized that any 
critical analysis of neoliberalism must also draw on “an interpretation and genealogy of 
neoliberal ways of thinking, measuring, evaluating, criticizing, judging and knowing” 
(Davies 2014, 23). 
In fact, neoliberal ways of evaluating are strategic for understanding both the rise 
and resilience of neoliberalism, and the character of neoliberal authority, that is on 
what basis the neoliberal state demands the right to be obeyed. Evaluation plays a 
strategic role in stabilizing, legitimizing and reproducing neoliberalism, as well as in ne-
oliberalizing states. By putting evaluation at the joining point of different understand-
ings of neoliberalism, the present contribution focuses on the key role played by evalu-
ation in these processes.  
Whatever the understanding, evaluation can be considered as one of the main strat-
egies of neoliberalization, because of its ability to emphasize two characteristics of ne-
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oliberalism: 1) its adaptive capacity to different socio-political contexts and 2) its pur-
pose to depoliticize public action (Moini 2015). Evaluation is one of the main tools 
through which the restructuring of the State is performed and legitimized. Meanwhile, 
it is also a device to implement and support neoliberal policies and programs both na-
tionally and internationally. The contribution aims to emphasize how evaluation works 
on a twofold level. On the one hand, it is a tool of global governance that acts norma-
tively to homogenize states’ action consistently with some neoliberal values, such as 
competitiveness and economic efficiency. On the other hand, in order to conform to 
such values, the states constantly monitor and assess public action and policies, as well 
as the conduct of individuals and organization, for the purpose of introducing market 
rationality in non-economic domains, such as education, health system, justice and 
public services. We describe these two overlapping processes – namely the “evaluated 
state” and “evaluative state”– in sections no. 4. In the next section, the paper briefly 
describes the paradigm shift from the welfare state to the neoliberal state occurred 
from the seventies onwards and introduces four different understandings of neoliber-
alism. Then section no. 3 focuses on the special role of evaluation for neoliberalism’s 
ascendancy and resilience. The article ends with some concluding remarks.   
 
 
2. Understandings of neoliberalism, understanding neoliberalism 
 
Since the seventies neoliberal ideas have established themselves as the main answer 
to the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state and lasting stagflation. It was a fiscal 
(O’Connor 1973), governability (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975) and legitima-
tion (Habermas 1976) crisis that paved the way to an all-encompassing critique of the 
state as the source of every kind of waste and as a brake on prosperity. The transfor-
mation of state action and the change in its modalities of intervention was the major 
success of the neoliberal turn in the seventies. After the first experiment in Chile under 
Pinochet, neoliberal policies were implemented in leading Western countries by Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, which established neoliberalism as the new dominant 
paradigm shaping all policies both nationally and internationally.  
Several studies showed how the global spread of neoliberalism has been facilitated 
by different causes. Firstly, the transition from the Keynesian national welfare state to 
the Schumpeterian competition state (Jessop 2002) was associated with the globaliza-
tion of economy and finance and the development of new information technologies, 
both of them constituting an effect of neoliberal policies, as well as a catalyst for their 
spread. Secondly, it was favoured by the neoliberal turn in the politics of many West-
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ern governments, that transformed the meaning of the remit of major international in-
stitutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, to the extent that they acted as the 
main vectors for the global diffusion of neoliberal ideas. Thirdly, the crisis of left-wing 
parties and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc favoured the acceptance of neoliberalism 
also by the modern Left and post-communist countries. To the extent that since the 
nineties neoliberalism has entered into mainstream politics almost without regard for 
old partisan divides and national boundaries.  
Different understandings of neoliberalism have been proposed to explain its rise and 
resilience. Following Ward and England (2007), we can identify:  
1) Neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project. Based on neo-Marxist studies, 
this understanding sees neoliberalism as part of the class struggle for dominance 
over the ideas (and minds) of the social formation (Harvey 2005). Strongly influ-
enced by Gramsci, hegemony is understood not just about imposition, but also 
about “willing consent” by those being subordinated. As Hall (1988, 52) pointed 
out, the aim of the struggle is “to gain ascendancy over the entire social formation, 
to achieve positions of leadership in a number of different sites of social life at 
once, to achieve the commanding position on a broad strategic front”. Neoliberal-
ism is the ideology associated with the successful restoration of class power by 
world economic elites occurred from the seventies onwards. Ideology is not the 
engine of neoliberal revolution, which realized through the material compromise 
between capitalists and the upper fractions of managerial classes. Nevertheless 
when a neoliberal ideology emerged, it was a crucial tool for the establishment of 
neoliberalism (Duménil and Levy 2011). Such an ideology is understood to rest on 
five values – the individual, freedom of choice, market security, laissez faire, and 
minimal government (Larner 2000) – which have become “the commonsense way 
we interpret, live in, and understand the world” (Harvey 2005, 23). 
2) Neoliberalism as governmentality. Based on post-structuralist studies, this under-
standing implies power “as a complex, yet very specific form centering on 
knowledge production through the ensemble of rationalities, strategies, technolo-
gies, and techniques concerning the mentality of rule that allow for the de-centering 
of government through the active role of auto-regulated or auto-correcting selves 
who facilitate ‘governance at a distance’” (Springer 2012, 137). Neoliberalism is “the 
new way of the world” (Dardot and Laval 2014), a political rationality based on a set 
of discourses, practices and apparatuses that constitute a new modality of govern-
ment of human beings, in accordance with an entrepreneurial model and the univer-
sal principle of competition. It is a constructivist project involving a normative rather 
than ontological claim about the pervasiveness of economic rationality.  
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3) Neoliberalism as policy and program. This understanding refers to the transfer of 
ownership from the public to the private sector, through policies and programs ad-
vanced under the banners of deregulation, privatization, liberalization, depoliticiza-
tion and monetarism. These policies involve a conceptual reworking of the mean-
ing that categories such as “state”, “market”, “public” and “private” hold. The 
premise of this understanding is the idea that the market is the most efficient insti-
tution for the production and allocation of resources. 
4) Neoliberalism as state form. This understanding refers to “the quantitative and 
qualitative restructuring of nation-states, involving redrawing the boundary be-
tween civil society, market, and state” (Ward and England 2007, 12). Neoliberalism 
is considered as a process of transformation (neoliberalization) that states pur-
posefully engage in to remain economically competitive. As Peck pointed out, ‘‘the 
embrace of neoliberalism lead states to denigrate their own capacities and poten-
tialities, to restructure and to cut themselves, to engineer their own ‘reform and 
downsizing’” (2001, 446). 
In general terms, the rise of neoliberalism has led to the recognition of the following 
principles: 1) the acknowledgment of competitive market as the most efficient and 
morally superior institution for the production and allocation of resources; 2) the repu-
diation of any form of State intervention in reducing market inequalities; 3) the exalta-
tion of freedom at the expense of equality; 4) the demotion of social rights and 5) the 
reduction of individual freedoms to economic freedom.  
Although, theoretically, neoliberalism can be considered as a paradigm based on 
general principles, “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002, 349) 
shows that those principles are adapted in a creative manner to different historical, 
economic, political and institutional backgrounds. Hence, the notion of “variegated ne-
oliberalization” has been introduced to emphasize “the constitutively incomplete, ex-
perimental and ultimately polymorphic character of neoliberalization processes” 
(Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, 217).  
Conceiving neoliberalism as a process (neoliberalization) rather than an end-state 
reveals some analytical advantages. In particular, it allows to reconcile perspectives fo-
cusing on the homogenizing capacity of neoliberalism as global regulatory regime 
(Crotty 2003) with those emphasizing the multifaceted actual manifestations of neolib-
eral values (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). The variegation of concrete forms and the 
sharing of general values are not inconsistent, but strengthen each other (Moini 2015). 
Therefore, the analysis of different processes of neoliberalization is helpful for under-
standing “the ways in which ideologies of neoliberalism are themselves produced and 
reproduced through institutional forms and political action” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 
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383). In general sense, neoliberalization is both an “out there” and “in here” phenom-
enon, that denotes a politically guided intensification of market rule and commodifica-
tion. As far as the state is concerned, its transformation is driven both by a neoliberal 
metalogic of convergence and by an active state-driven construction and consolidation 
of neoliberalized state forms. In other words, the state is both the victim and the mas-
ter of its neoliberalization, with the global hegemonic classes that have purposefully 
operated for its transformation in order to strengthen their power. 
 
 
3. Evaluation as a tool of neoliberal governance  
  
We use evaluation as an umbrella term for a wide range of techniques – such as au-
dits, rankings, ratings, indicators and indexes – that systematically assess the perfor-
mance of individuals, organizations and states. By the arrangement of a special culture 
(including auditing, monitoring, and measuring) and instruments, aimed at creating a 
comparative system that makes possible both the measurement of overall phenomena 
and the calculation of the gaps between individuals, states and organizations, evalua-
tion allows to describe, judge, measure, and compare various actors based on a com-
mon metric (Foucault 1999). By drawing up rankings (of democracy, debt, corruption, 
transparency, economic freedom, and so on) between countries, evaluative instru-
ments are able to signal virtuous and non-virtuous actors, thus legitimizing certain poli-
cies at the expense of others. Those instruments “are not only informational devices 
that grease the wheels of commerce, but profoundly disciplining ones as well” (Four-
cade and Healy 2007, 304).  
It is no coincidence that the ages of neoliberal triumph have coincided with the pro-
liferation of instruments aiming at measuring, monitoring, and evaluating state’s be-
havior with respect to issues such as debt, corruption, democracy, transparency, media 
freedom, creditworthiness, and business environment. There are theoretical and prac-
tical reasons that explain this phenomenon. 
Firstly, the neoliberal dogmatism of rationalizing every aspect of human life made 
evaluation based on calculation, quantification and standardization a major strategy to 
manage uncertainty. Neoliberalism understands individuals, organizations and states 
as rational actors which need impartial, updated and comparable data to make rational 
choices. Since “knowledge claims based on quantitative measures are commonly treat-
ed as though they had a distinct and superior status compared to claims based on oth-
er forms of information” (Munck 2009, 10), evaluation is acknowledged as the privi-
leged method of knowledge of neoliberalism. The latter takes to the extreme one of 
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the crucial features of the development of capitalism, that is “decision making based 
on numbers, rather than duty, magic, or custom, [as] a radically new orientation to-
ward business” (Stevens and Espeland 2005, 375). An orientation involving the deper-
sonalization of business relations and a more objective stance toward business choices.  
Secondly, such depersonalization concerns also the political sphere, as neoliberalism 
has favoured a shift from politicized forms of economic management, that were domi-
nant during the period 1945-76 and were characterized by discretion-based decision-
making by government, to depoliticized forms, which are being dominant since the 
eighties and characterized by rules-based decision-making. In this context, neoliberal-
ism can be interpreted as an attempt to replace political judgement with economic 
evaluation (Davies 2014). But depoliticization does not mean the “end of politics”, as it 
is a highly political governing strategy taking three different forms: 1) the reassignment 
of government tasks to ‘non-political’ bodies, such as the European Central Bank; 2) 
the adoption of measures ostensibly to increase the accountability, transparency and 
external validation of policy; 3) the acceptance of external binding ‘rules’ which limit 
government room for manoeuvre (Burnham 1999; Moini 2015). As Supiot pointed out, 
one of the main depoliticization strategy is to remove the political character of deci-
sion-making by transforming “le gouvernement par les lois” into “la gouvernance par 
les nombres” (2015, 462). In order to understand the resilience of neoliberalism, the 
political power of numbers, their performative character, as well as the control of their 
production and use, are crucial political and research issues (De Leonardis and Neresini 
2015). In this context, evaluation is among the privileged depoliticization strategies, as 
it produces numbers that make evaluated subjects comparable and quantifiable.  
 Thirdly, evaluation is fostered by the commodification of every human action and 
product that neoliberalism demands. As Mosco pointed out, “commodification de-
mands the use of measurement procedures to produce commodities and monitoring 
techniques to keep track of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption” 
(2009, 141). If data are organized, accessible, and capable of being provided in manipu-
lable and discrete units, they become a valuable good (Schiller, 1989).  
Fourthly, evaluation has been favoured by the development and rapid diffusion of 
new information and communication technologies (ICTs). Since neoliberalism seeks to 
bring all human action into the domain of the market, “this requires technologies of in-
formation creation and capacities to accumulate, store, transfer, analyse, and use mas-
sive databases to guide decisions in the global marketplace. Hence neoliberalism’s in-
tense interest in and pursuit of information technologies” (Harvey 2005, 3). Thanks to 
the digital revolution it is often cheap and easy to formulate and disseminate bench-
marks. ICTs have made quantitative data more accessible and recordable. Further-
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more, the evaluative instruments based on the quantitative measurements done by 
ICTs records, are more objectifiable. Hence, ICTs can be regarded as “the privileged 
technology of neoliberalism” (Harvey 2005, 68).  
Finally, the growth of international neoliberalism gave an impetus for the spread of 
ratings and rankings, because of new factors emanated from neoliberal interests, vi-
sions and understandings of the developed world vis-à-vis the developing world (Arndt 
and Oman 2006). One of these factors is that the large increase in international in-
vestment in developing countries has prompted investors to seek more information to 
help them reduce risk to their investments. Furthermore, starting from the nineties in 
many Western countries there has been a move towards more transparent and ac-
countable public policies, which has prompted governments to justify expenditures 
such as foreign aid according to measurable and supposedly objective benchmarks and 
standards (Löwenheim 2008).  
 
 
4. Evaluation and the making of neoliberal state 
  
Neoliberalism is a self-contradicting theory of the state (Harvey 2005). On the one 
hand, by downsizing government and dismantling welfare state, it appears to aim for a 
less interventionist state. On the other hand, the state is seen to play an indispensable 
role in the creation, governance, and conduct of markets, including at the international 
scale. In order to understand this apparent contradiction, various authors prefer to use 
the term “neoliberalization”, for emphasizing the spatial and temporal dynamics of ne-
oliberalism, described as two partly overlapping processes. The first are the “roll-back” 
processes, which “tend to be predominant with the initial onset of neoliberalization, 
when restructuring projects are typically focused on dismantling alien institutions […] 
and disciplining potentially unruly (collective) subjects” (Peck 2010, 22, my italics). 
These processes have been prosecuted in the name of privatization, deregulation, dis-
creditation and dismantlement of welfare state and social-collectivist institutions. 
Greatly influenced by Hayek (1944; 1973), this phase of creative destruction was char-
acterized by the understanding of the market as a spontaneous and self-regulating in-
stitution tending to equilibrium, and the state planning as inefficient and threatening 
individual freedom. The second are the “roll-out” processes, which are typically associ-
ated with an “explosion of ‘market conforming’ regulatory incursions” (Peck 2010, 23), 
as well as with forms of reregulation through adaptation. These processes focus on the 
“purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of 
governance, and regulatory relations” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 384). Deep neoliberaliza-
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tion rests on proactive statecraft and institution-building in service of neoliberal goals, 
as the state is in charge to provide the legal, regulatory, fiscal and institutional frame-
work for the implementation of market principles, as well as for the positive creation of 
new markets. This implies the extension of market rationality to public sector too (Bu-
chanan 2000). 
Despite the fact that “evaluation practices are firmly embedded in and inextricably 
tied to particular social and institutional structures and practices” (House e Howe 2000, 
3), the relationship between neoliberalization and evaluation has been nearly over-
looked especially as far as the transformation of the state is concerned. To the extent 
that only recent studies have emphasized the global power of rankings and indicators 
and the political aspects of grading states (Cooley and Snyder 2015; Davis et al. 2012). 
In particular, those studies underscored evaluation’s ability to act as a tool of global 
governance, which is able to neoliberalize states through the normative and discipli-
nary power of rankings and indicators. This process combines with variegated forms of 
evaluation, which differ both by spatial dimension and policy sector. Since evaluation 
techniques “adapt to the particular rhetorical, normative and pragmatic purposes of 
the actors who use them” (Davies 2014, 35), through evaluation different states – as 
systems of neoliberal governance – implement national and policy variants of neoliber-
alism with the aim to conform themselves to the global principle of competition 
(Giancola 2015).  
Roll-back neoliberalization compels each state to become an entrepreneurial state in 
competition against others for running after capital. Governments’ efforts have to 
move from full employment and inclusive welfare systems to economic efficiency and 
international competitiveness. The old system of bureaucratic judgement, which was 
dominant over the so-called “golden age” of welfare state, is now substituted by the 
more regular evaluation of individual competence that carries out at every instant 
(Dardot and Laval 2014).1 As Davies pointed out: “Neoliberalism is typically less con-
cerned with expanding markets per se, than in expanding the reach of market-based 
principles and techniques of evaluation. […] Institutions […] [such as] trade unions, fam-
ilies, artists, democratic procedures, law, traditions and professions all make claims to 
 
1 The bureaucratic judgement was based on the creation of classification systems constructed on the 
statutory qualities assigned to individuals in the course of his/her educational and professional career. The 
evaluation of individuals was based on the statistical probability of a link between the situation of each 
individual in the classification and his/her personal effectiveness. This system allowed a high predictability 
of individual situations, as to professional advancement, social security allowance, etc. Neoliberal tenet 
considers such a predictability as a way of making individual indolent, less active, and not inclined to put 
himself into play. 
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authority and justification, by appealing to tacit and/or incalculable notions of what 
counts as justice or the common good. They […] refuse measurement. They typically 
abstain from offering factual, quantitative justifications for their existence and activi-
ties. Neoliberal critique cannot simply abolish all of these institutions, or replace all of 
them with markets, but the targeted use of economics can seek to replace normative, 
critical evaluation with economic, technical evaluation” (2014, 32). Since the eighties a 
strong focus has emerged on the measurement of political and economic aspects of 
countries. As hegemonic ideology, neoliberalism has made some values more relevant 
than others and some evaluation tools preferable to others, by stressing the need to 
assess, measure and monitor specific topics, such as creditworthiness, public indebt-
edness, economic freedom, corruption, and transparency, through specific neoliberal 
instruments. Hence, evaluation practices have constituted an overall system of exami-
nations that establishes and/or reaffirms structures of hierarchy and authority in the 
international system (Löwenheim 2008). Some examples may clarify this point which is 
crucial for the rise of the “evaluated state”. 
In fact the roll-back processes of dismantlement of welfare state and liberalization of 
domestic markets had to be evaluated through instruments capable of measuring 
states’ ability to conform to market rationality. Many indexes of global governance,2 
such as the index “Economic Freedom of the World” by the Canadian Fraser Institute, 
the “Index of Economic Freedom” by the Heritage Foundation and the “Global Compet-
itiveness Index” by the World Economic Forum, were created to measure those states 
performances. These indexes have been used by national governments – such as the 
US – and international institutions – such as the World Bank – to implement their for-
eign and development policies to developing countries. For instance, in 2004 the US 
Congress created the Millennium Challenge Corporation, as an independent US foreign 
aid agency with the aim to fight against global poverty, by delivering foreign assistance 
to countries. The selection of eligible countries is based on various indicators3 from dif-
ferent sources. The most of these indicators focus on state’s capacity to liberalize do-
mestic markets (“trade policy” indicator by the Heritage Foundation), and foster com-
petitiveness and entrepreneurship (“access to credit” indicator and “business start-up” 
indicator by the International Finance Corporation). This external evaluation tends to 
remove the political character of countries selection and through a ‘depoliticization by 
numbers’ it surreptitiously rewards neoliberalizing states (that is states implementing 
 
2 An updated list of these instruments is the Global Benchmarking Database by the Centre for the Study of 
Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick. Available at: 
www.warwick.ac.uk/globalbenchmarking/database. 
3 For a list of indicators, see http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection/indicators 
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neoliberal reforms) and punishes welfare states. As several studies demonstrated (Da-
vis et al. 2012; Giannone 2015; Merry et al. 2015), the selection of indicators is not just 
a methodological procedure, because the values and standards of the measuring in-
strument would still be set through an essentially political process, and the responses 
to the result of measurement are, at their core, a matter of political judgement. Indica-
tors can be seen as “political spaces” (Urueña 2015) because “political judgements are 
implicit in the choice of what to measure, how to measure it, how often to measure it 
and how to present and interpret the results” (Alonso and Starr 1987, 3). Furthermore, 
in the neoliberal State, indicators have a “feedback effect on quantified subjects […] 
that takes the form of benchmarking, evaluation, ranking and centrality of perfor-
mance” (Desrosières 2011, 380 and 382). 
Another example of external evaluation is the measurement of countries’ level of 
good governance by the World Bank. In order to realize its structural adjustment pro-
grams, the World Bank measures good governance through an instrument, based on 
indicators provided by various sources (including the Heritage Foundation and Free-
dom House), which tends to focus on the assessment of government’s ability to foster 
private business and trade liberalization, to reform public sector and protect property 
rights (Giannone 2010b). The term “good governance” seems to remove the political 
character of these structural reforms, that are negotiated with the country concerned, 
thus creating a variegation of neoliberal (re)forms, as part of “a revised neoliberal 
model stressing market-friendly state intervention” (Peet 2003, 129).  
The power of evaluation also lies in its ability to legitimize a new understanding of 
democracy, consistent with the neoliberal view of exalting economic freedom, neglect-
ing socio-economic equality and considering negatively the state’s role in the economy. 
As has been previously demonstrated (Giannone 2010a), the construction and succes-
sive transformations of the Freedom in the World index by the American organization 
Freedom House – the most important instrument for measuring democracy around the 
world – have been affected by the rise of neoliberalism. Specifically, some indicator – 
such as “freedom from gross socioeconomic inequality” – referring to a more equalitar-
ian conception of democracy, has been deleted. Other indicators emphasize property 
rights and economic freedom, and equate government “unduly influence” on business 
activity to the one by organized crime, thus revealing a negative bias towards 
state/public role in the economy, which is typical of neoliberalism. This instrument is 
widely used by governments, national agencies (USAID), international institutions and 
organizations (the World Bank and the United Nations), thus contributing to the diffu-
sion and legitimation of its neoliberal understanding of democracy. 
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These kinds of evaluation favor the development of “evaluated state” processes. 
Specifically, they produce what Fourcade and Healy (2013) have termed as “within-
market classifications”,4 that is classifications with categories and thresholds that re-
strict access to certain resources. Compared to boundary classifications, within-market 
classifications are seemingly more democratic, since they do not exclude definitely 
evaluated states from the possibility to get access to those resources. Within-market 
classifications exercise a moral and disciplinary power, as in exchange for inclusion they 
require a commitment to improvement. These classifications “steer behavior toward 
some desirable goal, and encourage […] [the states] to stay on top of their commit-
ments. There are incentives for compliance, material or symbolic rewards for success, 
and sanctions for failure. Rewards and punishments are often themselves acts of re-
classification. Punitive reclassification, for instance, may entail higher premiums, loss of 
privileges, poorer service, or higher interest rates” (Fourcade and Healy 2013, 564).  
These processes of “evaluated state” help to create a new conception of the state as 
“evaluative state”.5 In fact the global diffusion of evaluation tools embodies “a pro-
foundly new sociopolitical view in which the behavior of actors is regulated internally 
through self-monitoring, rather than externally through coercion” (Fourcade and Healy 
2007, 304). Precisely because of its declared commitment to technicality, objectivity, 
rigour and impartiality, evaluation is a seemingly less restrictive and confrontational 
way to propagate neoliberal values. This makes it a privileged substitute for political 
choice in order to introduce market rationality and the neoliberal principles of compe-
tition and entrepreneurship in non-economic domains, such as education, public ser-
vices, and health system. 
Roll-out neoliberalization demands each state to have an active role in neoliberaliz-
ing society and individual conduct. The end goals of neoliberalization, such as “free-
dom, choice, consumer sovereignty, competition and individual initiative, as well as 
those of compliance and obedience, must be constructions of the state acting now in 
its positive role through the development of the techniques of auditing, accounting 
and management” (Olssen and Peters 2005, 315). Unlike other organizations, the state 
is a “consent-based principle of public order”, with the power to define and modify the 
 
4 There are two main kinds of classification: boundary classification, which distinguishes those who are “in” 
from those who are “out” (for instance members and non-members of the Eurozone), and the very wide-
spread within-market classification, which, “rather than dividing people into two mutually exclusive 
groups, […] position[s] them in a categorical framework or on a continuous scale, the latter usually having 
key cut-points or thresholds” (Fourcade and Healy 2013, 564).  
5 The expression “evaluative State” was first introduced by Neave (1988 and 2012) and used to describe 
the transformation of the state’s role in higher education. But this process can be considered as just one 
piece of a more general and all-encompassing transformation of the State.  
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rules of the game, to require compliance and confer trust. In its neoliberal configura-
tion, the state demands the right to be obeyed mainly on the basis of particular eco-
nomic claims and rationalities (Davies 2014). In this context, neoliberalism might be de-
fined as “the elevation of market-based principles and techniques of evaluation to the 
level of state-endorsed norms” (Davies 2013, 37). Since “systems of measurement are 
the mechanisms of neoliberal roll-out […] [and] metrics are needed to enable differen-
tiation, to facilitate rankings and to demarcate winners from losers” (Beer 2016), the 
evaluative state has the power of legitimizing “the production and canonization of 
[those] social classifications” (Bourdieu 2013, 23, my translation). 
The bureaucratic centralized control – as a typical feature of welfare state – is now 
substituted by a myriad of evaluation agencies, both nationally and internationally, as 
well as both public and private. These agencies manage to be simultaneously “modest 
and omniscient, limited yet apparently limitless in their application to problems as di-
verse as the appropriateness of a medical procedure and the viability of a university 
department” (Rose 2000, 54). As recent studies demonstrated (Gambardella and Lumi-
no 2015; Giancola 2015; Moini 2015), neoliberalization by evaluation is realized in ways 
that are variegated both by spatial dynamics and policy fields.    
Partly justified by economic efficiency requirements from the reform of European 
and national systems of governance, performance indicators aiming at measuring the 
level of competition, ability to attract funding, entrepreneurship, economic efficiency, 
have been extensively introduced for the evaluation of different non-economic do-
mains, such as higher education and health system. This evaluative knowledge is 
deemed able to reduce the irrationality of decision-making in these policy fields (Gam-
bardella and Lumino 2015). For instance, as far as universities are concerned, new per-
formance indicators tend to reward departments and professors’ ability to create rela-
tionships with the industrial world, attract external research funding, and improve re-
search income rather than the quality of scholarship (Olssen and Peters 2005). As 
Neave pointed out (2012, 278), “such evaluation affects whether [they] bargain for re-
sources from a position of strength or from a situation of publicly certified intellectual 
and moral debility”. 
Consistent with variegated neoliberalization, two carriers of change act simultane-
ously on education policies: 1) the first is related to international institutional pressures 
and the comparison of performance from international organizations such as the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development); 2) the second is related to 
the territorialization of educational facilities and the processes of decentralization and 
school autonomy (Giancola 2015).  
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With the PISA (Programme for International Students Assessment) study, the OECD 
spreads its neoliberal economic approach, conceiving education as a means to improve 
the competitiveness of a national economy (OECD 2006). As Knodel, Martens and Nie-
mann demonstrated, “PISA is not neutral. It evaluates education against predefined 
economic and utilitarian criteria and leaves out other aspects of education that are also 
traditionally seen as an integral part of that process” (2015, 211). With PISA, OECD un-
leashes massive reform pressure on countries education systems, pushing a turn in the 
leading ideas from social to economic principles. Although it does not offer direct rec-
ommendations, PISA provides a within-market classification of evaluated states and 
hints on best practices. While the ‘losers’ are driven to improve, “the ‘winners’ in the 
league table (for instance, Finland and Canada), which have comparable cultural and 
social structures, are presented as blueprints or role models for a successful schooling 
system” (2015, 216). PISA and the OECD primarily create an “air of competition” about 
educational matters. Hence, beyond the variegation in form, each evaluative state ends 
up reinforcing a system of market-oriented reforms through the second carrier of 
change, that is decentralization and school autonomy. In fact the latter are accompa-
nied by the reassignment of the task of evaluation, with the multiplication of the levels 
of oversight, as well as the proliferation of “instruments of a new surveillance, perfor-
mance indicators, quality indices, setting of ‘standards’ through ‘benchmarking’” 
(Neave 2012, 266). This “enduring tension” (2012, 275) between autonomy and con-
trol, decentralization and multilevel oversight, is characteristic of the evaluative State, 
which acts as “a broad operating frame in which the functions of definition, implemen-
tation, interpretation and verification are split up and assigned to different agencies 
and different levels of decision-making” (277).  
The obvious goal of evaluation is to create an accountable, manageable and govern-
able educational system. But at the same time evaluation works as an “ideologically 
driven system for disciplining and controlling doctors, teachers, university lecturers and 
so on, and not as an instrument of genuine accountability” (Power 2000, 114). 
It realizes what Foucault (1999, 101) pointed out about the means of correct train-
ing: “The distribution according to ranks or grade has a double role: it marks the gaps, 
hierarchizes qualities, skills and aptitudes; but it also punishes and rewards. […] By the 
play of this quantification, this circulation of awards and debits, thanks to the continu-
ous calculation of plus and minus points, the disciplinary apparatuses hierarchized the 
‘good’ and the ‘bad’ subjects in relation to one another. […] Discipline rewards simply 
by the play of awards, thus making it possible to attain higher ranks and places; it pun-
ishes by reversing this process. Rank in itself serves as a reward or punishment”. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The circumstances of neoliberal triumph involve political aspects (such as the con-
quest of power by the neoliberal forces), economic aspects (the expansion of global-
ized financial capitalism), as well as social aspects (the individualization of social rela-
tions to the detriment of collective and social rights, and the extreme polarization be-
tween rich and poor), cultural aspects (the rise of consumer society), and subjective 
aspects (the emergence of a new subject).  
Despite the economic crisis, neoliberalism has remained almost unchallenged. In or-
der to explain the resilience of neoliberal ideas, Schmidt and Thatcher have suggested 
five potential explanations: “first, the generality, flexibility, and mutability of neoliberal 
ideas themselves; second, the gap between neo-liberal rhetoric and a reality in which 
they are not implemented; third, their advantages in policy debates and political dis-
course compared with alternatives; fourth, the power of interested actors who strate-
gically adopt and promote neo-liberal ideas; and, fifth, the force of the institutions in 
which neo-liberal ideas are embedded” (2013, 1-2). Other authors have emphasized 
neoliberalism’ adaptive capacity, by focusing on the dynamic relationships between 
roll-back and roll-out processes of neoliberalization (Peck 2010). The variegation of na-
tional and policy forms reinforces neoliberal hegemony, as neoliberalization allows the 
coexistence of general principles with specific forms adapted to different contexts 
(Moini 2015). This article has shown the role of evaluation in these processes. As has 
been said, evaluation has a close connection with neoliberalization and is able both to 
legitimize neoliberal values and to reproduce them in variegated forms. As Broome and 
Quirk (2015: 821) pointed out, much of the power of evaluation “is bound up in the 
mechanics and effects of ranking and quantification, which in turn generate a form of 
‘constructed objectivity’ that acts back upon the reality it aims to describe”. This is the 
“feedback effect” of indicators on quantified subjects extensively described by 
Desrosières. Evaluation has the special capacity to cloak normative agendas in lan-
guages of neutral and technocratic assessment. By means of the rhetorical appeal to 
the alleged neutral language of expert assessment and numerical comparison, evalua-
tion objectifies and naturalizes contested political concepts, such as democracy, cor-
ruption, transparency, and freedom and reduces legitimate opposition to evaluators’ 
authority. On the one hand, evaluation is an instrument of class power, as the domi-
nant economic and political classes impose specific evaluation tools and topics (Gian-
none 2014). On the other hand, it is an instrument of classification power (Fourcade 
and Healy 2013), that is able to orient self-monitoring subjects to adjust their behavior 
to the hegemonic values. The power of evaluation “is exercised through its invisibility; 
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at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects to a principle of compulsory vis-
ibility” (Foucault 1999, 103), based on the motivation of transparency and accountabil-
ity. What is involved is the public estimation of worth and thus of the explicit value - or 
its lack - of one institution or individual compared to others. It is a technique of naming 
and shaming, which is typical for discourage some kinds of activity. 
Since the transformation of the state is among the main objectives of neoliberalism, 
evaluation has played a central role in this process. Taking advantage of the aforemen-
tioned characteristics of evaluation, the making of the neoliberal state has been 
achieved through two overlapping processes, namely the “evaluated state” and the 
“evaluative state”.  
A transnational carrier of change, based on various global indexes aimed at assessing 
states’ performance with respect to the main neoliberal values, has pushed the evalu-
ated states into a global context of competition. The more each state is positively eval-
uated in its compliance with neoliberal norms, the more it is deemed as credible and 
accountable internationally. A positive evaluation could favor foreign investment, in-
ternational aid, money loans, good diplomatic and trade relations, the granting of fi-
nancial assistance, the purchase of government bonds in the financial markets, and so 
on. For these reasons, not only the states cannot avoid to be evaluated, but actually 
they pay to be evaluated. This is the case of the sovereign credit rating, where the 
states pay their raters, because the absence of the “seal of approval” of rating may be 
interpreted negatively by financial markets (Lehmann 2004).  
The evaluated state needs also to be able to self-evaluate. As it is subject to the 
norm of competition, it is obliged to regard itself as an enterprise both in its internal 
functioning and in its relationship to other states (Dardot and Laval 2014). Hence, the 
neoliberal state is an aggressively utilitarian state, in the sense that it seeks to make all 
political, legal and public action subject to quantitative empirical evaluation (Davies 
2014). The states become “inveterate classifiers. They count, rank, measure, tag, and 
score on various metrics of varying degrees of sophistication, automation, and opacity. 
The data collected in these procedures becomes grist for analytical machines devoted 
to further refining the classification system itself, and the engine for allocating individ-
uals [organizations and states] to some tier or group on the basis of that classification” 
(Fourcade and Healy 2013, 562). The state does not necessarily (or at least, not always) 
cede power to markets, but comes to justify its decisions, policies and rules in terms 
that are commensurable with the logic of markets (Davies 2014). The neoliberal state 
indirectly conducts individuals to conduct themselves like entrepreneurs. This mode of 
governmentality specific to neoliberalism includes “techniques of governing that ex-
ceed express state action and orchestrate the subject’s conduct toward him or herself” 
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(Brown 2005, 43). A second carrier of change, based on variegated forms of evaluation, 
is pushed by the “evaluative State”, that, through a myriad of evaluative agencies, con-
stantly monitors and measures public sector’s performance, as well as individual and 
organization behavior. 
As Power (2000) pointed out, the rise of the neoliberal evaluative state has been 
driven not only by the financial constraint imposed by the New Public Management, 
but also by the political demands on behalf of citizens – as taxpayers, patients, pupils – 
for greater accountability and transparency of service providing organizations, as well 
as by the rise of quality assurance practices and related transformations in regulatory 
style. Therefore political motives for increased auditing, evaluation and monitoring ac-
tivity, include making public organizations and individuals accountable and transpar-
ent. Thus, such seemingly democratic reasons made financial audits evolving into elab-
orated practices of quantification in organizations and individuals performance. The 
depoliticization of public action supported by neoliberalism led to the gradual replace-
ment of political choice and expert knowledge with the know-hows of enumeration, 
calculation, monitoring, and evaluation: a process described as the transition from the 
rule of law to the governance by numbers (Supiot 2015). Through evaluation the state 
is both the subject and the protagonist of its neoliberalization. Indeed, we can even say 
that evaluation is “the state’s own way of existence in its neoliberal configuration” 
(Pinto 2013, my translation).  
The rise of the evaluative state could not have been achieved without the recogni-
tion of a “philosophy of evaluation” (Martuccelli 2010), that made the instruments of 
auditing, monitoring, and inspection more central to the operational base of govern-
ment. Among the consequences of the spread of that philosophy, it is the often uncriti-
cal acceptance of the results of evaluation: this is partly due to the fact that “part of 
the very function of establishing evaluative standards is to change the culture of the 
phenomenon that is being evaluated” (Stremlau 2011, 192). Also the resilience of ne-
oliberalism is a phenomenon to be evaluated: “Resilience is a process, not a fixed state 
– it occurs and must be assessed over time” (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013: 403). But to 
imagine a deadlock in neoliberalization implies recognizing that the assessment of this 
highly political process, marked by struggles to determine agendas, set goals, and se-
lect policies, should be preceded by the rise of alternative understandings able to im-
pose new evaluative instruments and a new philosophy of evaluation, based on alter-
native values and different criteria. 
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